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ABSTRACT 
We test and offer support to Merton’s (1987) theory that difference in a stock’s investor 
recognition affects its cost of capital. In the U.S. market, using the breadth of ownership among 
retail investors as a proxy for investor recognition, we show that a long-short portfolio based on 
the annual change of shareholder base earns a compounded annual abnormal return of 6.42% 
after controlling for the Fama-French three factors. These results are more pronounced among 
young, low visibility and high idiosyncratic volatility stocks, and are robust to various controls 
such as momentum, breadth of institutional ownership, analyst coverage, liquidity, idiosyncratic 
volatility, trading volume, accruals, capital investment, probability of informed trading (PIN), 
and retail investor sentiment. Moreover, we present evidence that the investor recognition effect 
can explain approximately 20% of the net equity issuance effect documented by Pontiff and 
Woodgate (2008). 
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1. Introduction 
The acquisition of information and its dissemination to all economic units are central activities 
in capital markets. With limits to information diffusion, all investors cannot distill new information 
on securities and incorporate that information into prices instantaneously. Ample empirical 
evidence (French and Poterba, 1991; Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Hong, et al., 2008) shows that 
many investors only know about and invest in a subset of the available securities in the investment 
community. 
Merton (1987) proposes a capital market equilibrium model with incomplete information. 
When constructing optimal portfolios, investors include in their investment choices only those firms 
with which they are familiar, so the aggregate demand for each firm’s stock comes from only a 
proportion of investors in the market. As investors differ in their “awareness” subsets, each firm’s 
stock is held by a different proportion of investors. In equilibrium, a firm’s degree of “investor 
recognition” is positively associated with the contemporaneous stock price and negatively 
associated with future expected return. Moreover, because firms held by restricted investors render 
their shareholders relatively undiversified compared to the optimal market portfolio, the higher risk 
premium for low visibility firms should be particularly large for stocks with high idiosyncratic 
volatility to compensate investors for bearing the additional undiversified risk. 
The early empirical work that foreshadowed Merton’s (1987) model dates back to Arbel et 
al. (1983), who document a “neglected firm” effect among stocks with few institutional holdings.1 
To facilitate information diffusion to investors, CFOs and investor relations experts in a firm can 
 
1 Many papers examine events that can eliminate market segmentation due to investment barriers and increase the 
size of a firm’s investor base, such as the initial public offering as the origin of a public-listed firm’s investor 
recognition (Kadlec and McConnell, 1994; Kecskes, 2009), non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges 
(Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; King and Segal, 2008), inclusion in the S&P 500 index (Chen et al., 2004), a 
reduction in the minimum trading unit (Amihud et al., 1999), and “sin” stocks restrictedly held by certain 
institutions (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009). 
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adopt a variety of activities to increase the firm’s visibility among potential investors, such as 
competing for analyst coverage (Womack, 1996; Irvine, 2003; Anantharaman and Zhang, 2008), 
market advertising (Grullon et al., 2004; Lou, 2008; Chemmanur and Yan, 2008), voluntary 
information disclosures (Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002), equity ownership of new 
institutional investors (O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990), and undertaking public seasoned equity 
offerings as opposed to rights offerings (Merton, 1987). 
Despite the many event studies in search of an investor recognition premium, systematic 
tests on the empirical cross-sectional relation between investor recognition and expected stock 
returns have been rare until recently (Bodnaruk and Östberg, 2009; Lehavy and Sloan, 2008). 
Bodnaruk and Östberg (2009) use the numbers of retail and institutional investors in Swedish firms 
to proxy for investor recognition, and show that they are important negative predictors of cross-
sectional difference in stock returns on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Employing the change in 
the breadth of institutional investors in the U.S., Lehavy and Sloan (2008) find that expected stock 
return is decreasing in this proxy of investor recognition. 
To devise a sharper and more powerful test of Merton’s (1987) theory in the U.S. market, in 
this paper we propose a new proxy to measure investor recognition: change in the ownership 
breadth of retail investors, or, simply, shareholder base growth. Each year, the number of retail 
shareholders is reported in each listed company’s 10-K filings and can be collected from the 
Compustat annual files. We believe that our proxy of investor recognition has merit in three 
respects. 
First, Merton’s (1987) incomplete information argument should hold particularly true for 
retail investors, who are more likely to be time constrained for doing research, with limited access 
to information and lack of expertise. Second, the availability of data on this proxy enables us to 
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increase the power of the test by examining a long period of stock returns over 30 years (1977-2008) 
and for an average of 3,287 firms per month in the U.S. market, as compared to 6 years (1995-2001) 
and average 243 public firms in Bodnaruk and Östberg’s (2009) study of the Swedish market. Third, 
the breadth of ownership among retail investors provides intuitively better prediction of future 
returns than that among institutional investors, as in Lehavy and Sloan (2008). In a setting where 
stock prices are overvalued due to short-sale constraints, the percentage of institutional ownership 
also proxies for the availability of stocks for borrowing in short-sale activities, thus displaying 
positive stock return forecasting power (D’Avolio, 2002; Nagel, 2005). An increase in the retail 
shareholder base would naturally rule out this alternative explanation, as retail investors are hardly 
the source of stock lending for short-sales. 
We show that growth in the retail shareholder base can strongly and negatively explain the 
cross-sectional difference in stock returns, and that the result is robust to an extensive set of controls 
and testing methods in a variety of subsamples. A long-short trading strategy that buys the portfolio 
of lowest shareholder base growth stocks and sells the portfolio of highest shareholder base growth 
stocks earns a compounded annual abnormal return of 6.42% after controlling for the Fama-French 
(1993) three-factors in the 12 months after portfolio formation. The shareholder base growth effect 
is more economically prominent within a particular group of stocks with high idiosyncratic 
volatility and low investor recognition. Moreover, we show that our main finding survives control 
for momentum, breadth and percentage of institutional ownership, analyst coverage, liquidity, 
idiosyncratic volatility, trading volume, accruals, capital investment, and the probability of 
informed trading (PIN) in a context of Fama-Macbeth regression. 
Our study contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of stock price dynamics 
and lends empirical support to Merton’s (1987) model in the U.S. market, by using a novel proxy 
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and showing a robust cross-sectional relation between retail investor recognition and expected stock 
returns. It corroborates Merton’s (1987) proposition that expanding the breadth of investor 
cognizance and familiarity through advertising or investor relations is valuable, in the sense that it 
can reduce the firm’s cost of capital. 
Another contribution of this paper is that it provides an economic explanation for the net 
equity issuance puzzle documented by Pontiff and Woodgate (2008). Both theoretical and empirical 
work (Merton, 1987; Bodnaruk and Östberg, 2008) leads us to investigate the relation between the 
change in a firm’s investor base and a firm’s activities in SEOs, stock repurchases, and stock 
mergers and acquisitions. We show in Section 4 that the investor recognition hypothesis can explain 
about 20% of the stock return predictability from net equity issuance. At the same time, we 
conjecture that the investor recognition hypothesis can contain somewhat different information from 
what the new issues variable can imply. This is broadly supported by the evidence that shareholder 
base growth remains essentially strong when the equity issuance effect is less likely to apply. 
A strand of literature related to our paper explores the return effect of stocks that temporarily 
attract more attention. Among the variables that have been used to measure investor attention are 
trading volume (Gervais et al., 2001; Hou et al., 2008), media news and headlines (Meschke, 2004; 
Yuan, 2008; Fang and Peress, 2009), extreme returns (Barber and Odean, 2008), and active search 
frequency on the Internet (Da et al., 2009). These evidences suggest that faced with the daunting 
task of choosing from among thousands of publicly traded firms, investors are easily attracted to 
firms that have recently grabbed their attention. We demonstrate in Section 5.2 that our proxy for 
investor recognition differs from these short-run attention variables and has distinct implications for 
stock returns. 
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Finally, there is a growing literature on retail investor sentiment that examines the impact of 
systematically correlated trading among retail investors on stock prices (e.g., Kumar and Lee, 2006; 
Hvidkjaer, 2008; Dorn et al., 2008; Kaniel et al., 2008; Barber et al., 2009). As a natural extension, 
it is plausible to infer that such investor herding behavior could cause the annual change in a firm’s 
shareholder base. However, we argue that limited investor recognition reflects investors’ limited 
capacity to process information and is thus not a behavioral bias. Given that the competing theories 
of investor recognition and investor sentiment predict stock returns in the same direction, we 
distinguish the two stories by examining firms’ operating performances and returns around earnings 
announcements in portfolio sorts. In Section 5.2, we refute the alternative behavioral story by 
showing that the low returns to high shareholder base growth stocks are not driven by the 
irrationality of noise traders. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and 
our key variable for investor recognition. Section 3 presents the main hypothesis tests. Section 4 
makes a further distinction between the investor recognition effect and the net equity issuance effect. 
The possibility of alternative risk- and mispricing-based explanations for our results is explored in 
Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data 
Our initial sample includes all U.S.-domiciled ordinary common stocks listed on the NYSE, 
Amex, and NASDAQ from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The 
accounting information is from the Compustat industrial files from 1975 to 2006. The institutional 
and mutual fund ownership data are from the 13f/s12 common stock holdings files complied by 
CDA/Spectrum. The I/B/E/S summary recommendation database is obtained for computing analyst 
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coverage. We gathered the data on share issuance events, including SEO offerings, repurchase 
announcements, and merger announcements, from Thomson Financial’s SDC Platinum. The yearly 
PIN estimates for all NYSE/Amex common stocks from 1983 to 2001 were obtained from 
http://www.hvidkjaer.net. 
The variable of interest used to measure retail investor recognition is the year-on-year 
change of a firm’s retail shareholder base, with the number of common/ordinary shareholders 
obtained from the Compustat annual files. The data are derived from the firms’ 10-K filings, 
reported under Item 210(b) of SEC Regulation S-K. The number of shareholders for common equity 
is usually counted in brokers’ names, so if multiple individuals hold a stock through the same 
brokerage house, they would be identified as one record by the firm. Compustat starts to report the 
data in 1975, covered by 93% of firms (with 98% of the total market capitalization) on average in 
our sample. We define the annual shareholder base growth as the log change of the number of 
shareholders from fiscal year end t-1 to fiscal year end t: 
SBGt = Ln (Common Shareholderst ) – Ln (Common Shareholderst-1 ) (1) 
[Insert Fig. 1 Here] 
Fig. 1 plots the average firm’s level and change in the shareholder base over the sample 
period from 1975 to 2006.2 Panel A shows that the annual median number of shareholders for all 
firms gradually decreases during the period. This is mainly driven by the public listings of new 
firms, which comprise the bulk of our sample. When we divide our sample into groups according to 
their years of listing, we find that each subgroup achieves steady growth in the shareholder base 
after the firms are traded on the stock market. To look at the phenomenon from another perspective, 
                                                            
2 The mean (median) number of shareholders per firm is 16,939 (1,560) for the full sample, and the mean (median) 
for the log change of shareholders per firm is 3.61% (-1.37%). 
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a firm’s shareholder base is highly correlated with its age – the number of years since the stock’s 
first appearance in CRSP – at 0.51. 
The consistent decrease in the average retail investor base for newly issued firms can be 
accounted for by two facts. First, institutional investors have largely increased their share of the 
common stock market over the past 30 years (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). Second, the 
development of the financial market has enabled a larger number of young firms to issue public 
equity at an earlier stage in their life cycles (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2001; Fink et al., 2005), so 
that these firms have a relatively narrow investor base when they are initially exchange-traded.  
The evidence shown in Panel B is in line with our interpretation of Panel A. While older 
firms that were already listed at the beginning of our sample period remain a stable investor base 
over time, newly listed firms enjoy a rapid expansion in their shareholder bases, especially in the 
1980s and 1990s. More importantly, the shareholder base growth is most evident in the early years 
immediately after stocks are first listed on the public market. 
Overall, Fig. 1 suggests that despite the increased ownership of institutional investors, the 
breadth of retail shareholders can still act as a good proxy for investor recognition.3 Moreover, we 
expect that the investor recognition effect will be more likely to be identified in the later period of 
our sample and among young, small, and low investor recognition stocks. 
One caveat is that when we use a stock’s shareholder base to proxy for its investor 
recognition, the measure tends to underestimate the true recognition effect. By simply observing 
that two investors do not own a stock, we cannot distinguish one who does not know about the stock 
from the other  who researches but excludes the stock from her optimal portfolio. In the rationale of 
Miller’s (1977) model with difference of opinions and short-sales constraints, some investors are 
 
3 We show in Section 3.1 that a stock with a larger growth in its retail investor base also tends to be more broadly 
held by a larger number of institutional investors (mutual funds). 
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sitting on the “sideline” of the stock market because short-sales constraint prevents them from 
expressing their negative views by trading in the market. In line with this logic, an expansion in the 
investor base does not necessarily proxy for a higher degree of investor recognition, but could 
instead stand for a less severely binding short-sales constraint. When fewer pessimistic investors are 
shunned away from the market, prices are less likely to be overvalued relative to the fundamentals.4 
Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that our proxy’s underestimation of investor recognition 
will differ across stocks in a systematic manner. Note also that when the competing theories of 
Merton (1987) and Miller (1977) both apply, they predict stock returns in the  opposite directions. 
Hence, we expect that if there is a bias due to our proxy’s measurement, the results for our 
empirical tests of Merton’s (1987) model will only be underestimated. 
It is worth emphasizing that in the rest of the paper, we focus on the change rather than the 
level of shareholder numbers to carry out the test, for two reasons. First, the change variable 
provides a more comparable measurement for the cross-sectional difference in the degrees of 
investor recognition, due to the way in which our data are compiled. As mentioned previously, the 
true number of shareholders can be underestimated when multiple investors trade through a 
common brokerage, and such underestimation may not be uniform across stocks and could be 
greater among larger firms. Hence, we expect the change of shareholder numbers to be more 
representative of a firm’s changing condition of investor recognition, assuming that such 
underestimation will remain of a similar magnitude within a firm across time.  
The second reason has to do with the correlation of our investor recognition variables with 
other stock return determinants. Merton (1987) argues that for a firm with limited investor base, the 
shadow cost of incomplete information is a joint function of its idiosyncratic volatility, market value, 
 
4 Chen et al. (2002) find that change in the breadth of institutional investors positively, rather than negatively, 
predicts future stock returns. 
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and shareholder base. Given that a firm’s shareholder base has a strong correlation with 
idiosyncratic volatility and firm size in our sample, examining the relation between the level of 
shareholder numbers and expected returns can be confounded by these related factors. By using the 
change of shareholder numbers, we can largely purge the confounding effects and specifically 
examine the incremental effect of enhancing investor recognition on lowering a firm’s cost of 
capital.5 
At the end of June each year between 1977 and 2007, we assign each stock to different 
portfolios based on its annual shareholder base growth at fiscal year end t-1, hold the portfolios 
from July in year t to June in year t+1, and then rebalance the portfolios annually. We exclude 
stocks with number of shareholders less than 100 and growth rate equal to zero6. To eliminate 
extreme outliers, data are also trimmed at the 1% and 99% percentiles of the shareholder base 
growth each year. Our final sample consists of 3,287 firms per month on average, which is 
comparable to those used in previous asset-pricing studies (e.g., Fama and French, 2008).7 
 
3. Empirical results 
This section presents tests of our major hypothesis that retail investor recognition should be 
priced at the cross-sectional stock returns, and be more economically prominent among young, low 
 
5 The level of shareholder numbers has average cross-sectional correlation with idiosyncratic volatility and size at 
-0.30 and 0.64, respectively. For change of shareholder numbers, the correlation with idiosyncratic volatility and 
size drops to 0.04 and 0.03. 
6 Some firms report the same number of shareholders for two consecutive years, probably due to the brokerage-
counting method for data compiling. The number of these firms ranges from 108 to 403 each year during our 
sample period. On average, they only comprise 1.9% of the total market capitalization. We exclude this part of the 
sample from the sort-based analysis, but include them in the Fama-Macbeth regression tests later. 
7 Following Fama and French (2008), to be included in our sample a firm should have a non-negative book equity 
at the end of fiscal year t-1, non-missing data to compute market capitalization for December of t-1 and June of t, 
and the data available to construct our investor recognition measure. Our primary test consists of firms from all 
industries. The results in this paper are unchanged or become even stronger if we exclude financial, utility firms, 
closed-end funds, and REITs. 
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visibility, and high idiosyncratic volatility stocks. We achieve this goal by performing portfolio 
sorts on both one- and two-dimensions, and then examining the return spreads between the high and 
low extreme portfolios. 
  
3.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics of firm characteristics across shareholder base growth 
(SBGt-1) groups. Instead of sorting stocks equally into percentiles, we investigate in more detail 
when a firm’s shareholder base either increases or decreases, because we expect that there is a 
difference in the degree of measuring investor recognition between positive and negative SBGt-1. 
We are aware that besides investor recognition, the negative SBGt-1 can derive from a 
number of potential roles. First, along with the increase in institutional ownership (Gompers and 
Metrick, 2001), a portion of a firm’s common shares migrates into the hands of institutions from 
retail investors. Institutional investors are generally considered to be more sophisticated and hold a 
more diversified portfolio than individuals. Hence, in this case, the decrease in the retail shareholder 
base might not represent the severity of under-diversification and loss of investor awareness, but 
could be due to the increasing participation of professional fund managers.8 Second, the negative 
SBGt-1 can also arise from the fact that in a market with difference of opinions, some existing 
shareholders consider the firm’s stock as a short position in their optimal portfolio choices, so they 
simply sell the stock in hand. Nevertheless, if a firm with reductions in all classes of investors does 
not actively seek to raise its visibility in the investment community and re-expand its shareholder 
base, then it could fade out of attention for a larger number of investors and result in an increased 
cost of capital. 
 
8 We further address this issue in Section 5.1 by controlling for the percentage of institutional ownership in testing 
the investor recognition hypothesis. 
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In short, whereas a firm’s improving visibility can be convincingly viewed as the major 
driving force behind the positive SBGt-1, the inference from the negative SBGt-1 may be less clear. 
Consequently, we expect the positive SBGt-1 to carry more information for testing the investor 
recognition hypothesis than the negative SBGt-1. Hence, stocks with positive and negative SBGt-1 are 
sorted into quartiles, respectively. 
 [Insert Table 1 Here] 
In Table 1, characteristic variables are reported as the time-series averages of yearly cross-
sectional means (or medians) within each portfolio sorted by SBGt-1. There are, on average, 335 
stocks for each positive SBGt-1 quartile and 488 stocks for each negative SBGt-1 quartile per month. 
The portfolio in the positive high (negative low) SBGt-1 quartile has a median of 54% (-17%) log 
change in the number of shareholders annually. All stocks with positive SBGt-1 during the year have, 
on average, a positive median SBGt-2 in the last year, and vice versa. 
For firm fundamental and accounting information, we can see from columns SBt-2, Size, and 
AGE that stocks in both the positive high and negative low SBGt-1 quartiles are smaller, younger 
firms that initially have fewer individual shareholders.9 In columns B/M, NSt-1, ROEt-1, CAPEXt-1, 
and AGE, as SBGt-1 increases from negative to positive, the book-to-market ratio and firm age 
monotonically decrease, whereas firms’ net equity issuance, return-on-equity, and capital 
investment generally increase, lending support to our argument in Section 2 that growth firms are 
more inclined to experience an expansion in investor recognition. Firms also spend a larger amount 
on advertising relative to sales (as reported in column Advtt-1) when SBGt-1 increases, consistent 
with the finding of Grullon et al. (2004). 
 
9 To avoid a spurious relation between SBGt-1 and SBt-1 (both measured at the end of fiscal year t-1), we look at 
SBt-2 one year before the SBGt-1 is measured. 
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In the columns related to “Market variables”, stocks with a larger change in the ownership 
breadth of retail investors also enjoy a larger contemporaneous change in the ownership breadth of 
institutional investors, denoted as IBGt-1. In columns IOt-1 and NA, stocks in both the positive high 
and negative low SBGt-1 quartile portfolios are likely to have lower percentages of institutional 
ownership and smaller numbers of analysts covering the stocks, presumably because the institutions 
and analysts tend to follow large-sized firms. Finally, as denoted in columns IDIVOLt-1, TOt-1, and 
VOLUMEt-1, with the exception in the negative low SBGt-1 quartile, stocks with negative SBGt-1 
generally have lower idiosyncratic volatility, stock turnover and trading volume10 than stocks with 
positive SBGt-1. 
 
3.2. Univariate analysis 
We now turn to understanding the cross-sectional relation between shareholder base growth 
and expected stock returns. Following the sorting method in Section 3.1, we assign stocks according 
to SBGt-1 at the end of June each year and hold the portfolios over the next 12 months, for both 
equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) schemes. The monthly average raw return and 
excess returns adjusted for CAPM and the Fama-French (1993) three factors for each portfolio are 
calculated and reported in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
Consistent with our hypothesis, monthly average returns decrease monotonically with SBGt-1 
across the portfolios. Stocks in the negative low SBGt-1 quartile earn an average EW (VW) return of 
1.54% (1.32%) per month, and conversely, stocks in the positive high SBGt-1 quartile earn an 
 
10 Because Nasdaq is a dealer market with double counting of dealer buys and sells, the trading volume and 
turnover of stocks on Nasdaq and NYSE/Amex are not directly comparable. In this paper, the volume and 
turnover of Nasdaq stocks are divided by two. 
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average EW (VW) return of 0.95% (0.75%) per month. A long-short portfolio (Neg L - Pos H) that 
goes long in the negative low SBGt-1 quartile and short in the positive high SBGt-1 quartile can 
produce raw and risk-adjusted returns that are all statistically significant at the 1% level. For 
example, when stocks are equally weighted, the monthly abnormal return of the long-short portfolio 
after controlling for the Fama-French three factors is 52 basis points and more than 4.65 standard 
errors from zero. Moreover, the long-short portfolio derives its alpha from both the long and short 
legs, with 0.20% (t = 2.23) for the negative low SBGt-1 quartile and -0.33% (t = 2.65) for the 
positive high SBGt-1 quartile. For the value-weighted strategy, whereas the FF-3 alpha on the long-
short portfolio is 34 basis points per month (t = 2.71), it mainly comes from the short end at -0.25% 
(t = 2.50). The magnitude of the monthly risk premium can be translated into a compounded annual 
return of 6.42% (4.16%) for the EW (VW) portfolio, which is highly economically significant, 
given that our portfolios are annually rebalanced.11 
As explained previously, we hypothesize that a stronger negative cross-sectional relation 
should be found in the positive SBGt-1 portfolios. In unreported analysis, within the positive regime 
of SBGt-1, the differences in the FF-3 alpha between the lowest (Pos L) and highest (Pos H) quartiles 
of positive SBGt-1 are 0.41% (t = 3.55) for EW and 0.27% (t =  1.87) for VW, both of which are 
statistically significant. However, within the negative regime of SBGt-1, the differences in the FF-3 
alpha between the two extreme quartiles (Neg L and Neg H) are not significant for either portfolio 
weighting scheme. This is largely in line with our previous interpretation. To examine the effect of 
positive SBGt-1 more closely, by treating all stocks with negative SBGt-1 as one group, we form an 
alternative long-short portfolio (Neg – Pos H) that goes long in all stocks with negative SBGt-1 and 
 
11 We test the risk-adjusted return of the long-short portfolio after controlling for Chen, Novy-Marx and Zhang’s 
(2010) q-theory three-factor model. The monthly alpha is -0.27% (t = -2.17) for EW but loses statistical 
significance for VW (although still on the negative sign of -0.16%). We explore this issue further in footnote 14.  
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short in the positive high SBGt-1 quartile stocks. At the bottom of Table 2, we show that this 
alternative portfolio yields raw and excess returns of similar magnitude with our first long-short 
portfolio (Neg L – Pos H), with the FF-3 alphas at 0.52% (t = 5.26) for EW and 0.27% (t = 2.59) for 
VW.  
[Insert Fig. 2 Here] 
To examine consistency in the shareholder base growth effect over time, we plot the 
monthly average raw returns across SBGt-1 portfolios in time series, as illustrated in Fig. 2.  The two 
extreme quartiles with positive high (Pos H) and negative low (Neg L) SBGt-1 are presented, as well 
as the spread between these two series (Neg L – Pos H). Monthly returns are averaged within each 
year and reported for both equal-weighted and value-weighted methods. The graphs show that 
negative low SBGt-1 stocks generally outperform positive high SBGt-1 stocks. Over the 32-year 
sample period, returns of the long-short portfolio are positive for 23 years and 72% of the time, for 
both weighting schemes. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Table 3 investigates the robustness of the investor recognition effect by performing portfolio 
sorts in subsamples. We first formally test the time-series consistency of the effect in two 
subperiods. We then seek to examine the effect within different firm size groups. In the tests above, 
we form value-weighted portfolios with the aim to mitigate the concern that the effect is restricted 
to very small stocks. This is not enough, however. Table 1 shows that stocks within both the largest 
increase and decrease SBGt-1 quartiles are likely to be smaller in market size, so sorting stocks based 
on SBGt-1 in the whole sample and examining the returns on the long-short portfolio between the 
two extremes could still pick up many small stocks and neglect the large stocks, which comprise the 
majority of the total market capitalization. In the following discussion, for brevity, we focus on 
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Panel A of Table 3 when equal-weighted returns are used, as the value-weighted returns in Panel B 
have similar implications. 
First, we perform a subperiod analysis in the first two rows of Panel A, in which we report 
returns for SBGt-1-sorted portfolios during 1977-1992 and 1993-2008. The FF-3 alpha spreads on 
the long-short portfolio (Neg L – Pos H) are statistically significant in both periods. More 
importantly, the magnitude is greater in the later period 1993-2008. This confirms the result in Fig. 
2 and our previous conjecture that the investor recognition effect should increase in strength over 
time, when more young and small firms are publicly listed on the market and have a greater 
incentive to expand their shareholder bases to further reduce the cost of capital. 
Second, as an initial attempt to control for firm size, we examine stocks traded only on the 
NYSE/Amex. We find that excluding NASDAQ stocks does not alter the baseline result. Stocks in 
the positive high SBGt-1 quartile have an average FF-3 alpha of -0.45% per month. The FF-3 alpha 
for the long-short portfolio (Neg L – Pos H) remains large in magnitude, at 0.49% per month, with a 
t-statistic of 4.50. 
Next, we test the interaction of the investor recognition effect with firm size by conducting a 
two-way sort. Specifically, we first form Small, Medium, and Large size groups ranked on market 
capitalization, and then within each size group, we sort stocks into quartiles based on negative and 
positive SBGt-1 separately. The three size groups are determined by the 30th and 70th percentiles of 
NYSE market capitalization at the end of June of each year t. We find that in each size group, the 
positive high SBGt-1 quartile has a lower FF-3 alpha than the other quartiles. Moreover, the FF-3 
alpha of the long-short portfolio is most pronounced among the smallest stock subsample, at 0.50% 
per month (t = 4.13). While this is consistent with the notion that the investor recognition effect 
16 
 
should work especially for small-sized firms, we show that the long-short portfolio has a 
statistically significant FF-3 alpha even among the large-sized group at 0.32% (t = 2.64). 
In the last two rows, we perform additional tests by excluding stock returns in January and 
eliminating stocks with average prices of less than $5. Again, we find that neither the January 
returns nor the bid-ask bounces for penny stocks can explain the shareholder base effect. In 
summary, we can conclude that change in the investor base is a powerful and robust explanatory 
variable for the cross-sectional difference in expected stock returns. 
 
3.3. Interaction effect with other stock characteristics 
In this section, to further test Merton’s (1987) model, we examine the investor recognition 
effect within a particular firm characteristic group. As implied by Merton’s model, because a firm 
with only a subset of investors is required to offer additional returns to compensate investors for 
being imperfectly diversified, the investor recognition premium should be higher for a firm with 
greater idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, expanding a firm’s shareholder base should be particularly 
important for a stock that originally bears low visibility among retail investors. We adopt four 
variables to measure firm visibility: analyst coverage, institutional ownership, number of individual 
shareholders, and firm age. We hypothesize that the investor recognition effect should be most 
pronounced among stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility, fewer analysts following, low fraction 
of institutional ownership, low shareholder base, and young age. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
In Table 4, we conduct a similar two-way sort as before. Each month we first sort stocks into 
three terciles ranked on the firm characteristics, and then within each tercile we sort stocks based on 
SBGt-1, as we did in the baseline case. The long-short portfolio that goes long in the negative low 
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SBGt-1 quartile and short in the positive high SBGt-1 quartile stocks is formed within each 
characteristic tercile. Average monthly returns on the long-short portfolios within the three 
characteristic-ranked subgroups are calculated, as is the difference of returns between the high and 
low characteristic groups. 
The evidence shown in Table 4 consistently supports our hypothesis. In Panel A, for EW 
portfolios, both the raw and risk-adjusted returns on the long-short portfolio are largest in absolute 
magnitude and statistical significance within the high IDIVOL group. This is even more so when 
VW portfolios are used. The FF-3 alpha on the long-short VW portfolio in the high IDIVOL group 
is remarkably high at 1.06% per month (t = 3.43), 1.00% greater than that in the low IDIVOL group. 
In Panels B, C, D, and E, returns on the long-short portfolios broadly decrease with analyst 
coverage, institutional ownership, shareholder base, and firm age in absolute magnitude, especially 
for the VW portfolios. The long-short VW portfolios in small NA, low IO, low ShareBase, and 
young AGE group can yield both statistically and economically significant monthly FF-3 alphas at 
1.02%, 1.14%, 0.74%, and 0.37%, respectively. 
The overall message from this section is that change in the size of a firm’s retail investor 
base can robustly explain the cross-sectional difference of expected stock returns. The return 
predictability is particularly strong for firms with initially low level of investor visibility and 
increasing shareholder base, which confirms Merton’s (1987) proposition that expanding the 
breadth of investor cognizance and familiarity through advertising or investor relations activities is 
valuable for reducing the firm’s cost of capital. 
 
4. Shareholder base effect and net equity issuance effect 
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Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) and McLean et al. (2009) document a strong predictive power 
of share issuances for cross-sectional stock returns, both in the U.S. and international equity markets. 
A well-established strand of literature argues that the share issuance effect is caused by investors’ 
underreaction to managers’ market timing activities (Ritter, 2003; Greenwood and Hanson, 2010). 
Recently, several papers have aimed to explain this using an investment-based argument (Lyandres 
et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2010). In this paper, we posit a new hypothesis to (partly) explain the net 
equity issuance anomaly － the investor recognition hypothesis. 
Firms take the shareholder base into consideration when they decide their equity issuance 
and repurchase policies. For example, Merton (1987) asserts that when planning for an SEO, 
negotiated underwriting incurs much higher underwriting expenses than rights offering. However, 
with negotiated underwriting, a firm can take advantage of investment banks’ investor distribution 
channels to market new equity to other-than-existing shareholders, thereby expanding the firm’s 
investor base. Consider another example. Bodnaruk and Östberg (2008) show that in regard to 
payout policies, firms with low shareholder base choose to pay dividends rather than repurchase 
shares to avoid further reducing the investor base. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
In Table 5, we regress SBGt on the contemporaneous net equity issuance (NSt) during fiscal 
year t, as well as with the occasional events that can significantly broaden or narrow a firm’s 
investor base, in a Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional framework. SEO, REP, MAT, and MAA denote 
dummy variables for whether the firm experiences an SEO, a repurchase, being a target or an 
acquirer in a stock M&A in fiscal year t-1, t and t+1, as indicated in their subscripts. As reported in 
model 1, NSt is highly correlated with SBGt at the cross section, with the highest t-statistic in all 
models. In model 2, firms undertaking an SEO in year t-1 and year t realize a considerable increase 
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in SBGt of year t, and a larger investor base of year t can further support the success of a future SEO 
in year t+1. In model 3, Firms undertaking a share repurchase in the last and current year achieve a 
slight decrease in SBGt this year, but are less likely to repurchase shares next year, consistent with 
Bodnaruk and Östberg’s (2008) viewpoint. Model 6 shows that during the current year t, on average, 
an SEO increases a firm’s shareholder base by 12.8%, a repurchase decreases SBGt by 1.4%, being 
a target in an M&A decreases SBGt by 14.9%, and being an acquirer increases SBGt by 5.9%. 
In light of the strong correlation between shareholder base growth and net equity issuance, 
we explore the explanatory power of SBG for the equity issuance effect, by examining the NS-
sorted portfolio returns before and after controlling for SBG. For stock returns from July of year t to 
June of year t+1, SBG and NS are both defined as the log change in the number of shareholders and 
shares outstanding from fiscal year end t-2 to t-1. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
In Panel A.1 of Table 6, we first form equal-weighted quartile portfolios by sorting stocks 
based on NS. A high minus low NS-spread portfolio yields monthly raw return at -0.66% and 
abnormal return at -0.86% (-0.66%) after adjusting for the CAPM (FF-3) model. Next, in Panel A.2, 
we control for the SBG effect by first sorting stocks into quartiles based on SBG and then, within 
each SBG group we sort stocks into quartiles based on NS. Returns on the NS-sorted quartile 
portfolios are then averaged across the four SBG groups and reported. Compared to the returns in 
one-way sorts, average abnormal returns in both the high and low NS quartiles become smaller in 
absolute magnitude. Specifically, monthly raw and abnormal returns on the high minus low NS-
spread portfolio become -0.54% and CAPM (FF-3)-adjusted -0.71% (-0.53%). We define △α as the 
difference of high minus low NS-spread returns between the one- and two-way sorts. Column △α 
indicates that after controlling for SBG, the decreases in NS spread returns (in absolute terms) are all 
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statistically significant on raw and risk-adjusted basis. By measuring |△α| as a percentage of the 
original NS-spread returns |α| in the single-sort, the last column |△α|/|α| shows that SBG accounts 
for about 20% of the NS-return relation on FF-3 risk-adjusted basis.12 
Yet, despite the link between shareholder base growth and equity issuance, we argue that the 
two variables can contain different information for explaining the cross-sectional difference in stock 
returns. Whereas NS could to some extent proxy for the private information owned by the firm and 
manifested through managers’ market timing activities, SBG generally measures the degree of 
acknowledgement by the majority of investors in the market, who acquire information about the 
firm mainly through public channels. This visibility of the public information is valuable in the 
sense that it can affect investors’ demand for the firm’s equity and increase its firm value. Firms can 
implement many strategies to raise investor awareness, such as voluntary information disclosure 
and analyst coverage initiation (as discussed previously), without necessarily going for a new equity 
issuance. 
Consequently, we expect the shareholder base effect to be particularly stronger when a 
firm’s total number of shares outstanding remains stable. In Panel B of Table 6, we run monthly 
Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regressions of individual stock returns on lagged SBG and NS 
(defined the same as before), as well as typical controls used in previous literature, including market 
cap, book-to-market equity, and 12-month lagged returns (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). The time-
series means of the estimated coefficients and intercept are reported, and the t-statistics are 
calculated based on time-series standard errors of the monthly slopes and corrected for Newey-West 
(1987) autocorrelation with 12-month lags. First, in model 1, the strong statistical significance of 
 
12 In a similar vein, Lyandres et al. (2008) find that adding an investment factor into standard factor regressions 
can reduce the composite issuance effect by 40%. 
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SBG in the presence of Size, B/M, and MOM confirms our result of portfolio sorts in Section 3.2. In 
model 2, when we put both SBG and NS together with Size, B/M, and MOM to jointly explain the 
stock returns, our SBG measure survives the control of NS at the 10% significance level in the full 
sample. In model 3, we include the same set of variables as in model 2 but exclude stocks that have 
experienced SEOs, repurchases, and stock mergers in the past one year. This yields a stronger result 
on the coefficient of SBG than in model 2, which is now significant at the 5% level. Finally, with 
the inclusion of only stocks with zero change in NS, as shown in model 3, SBG retains its predictive 
power at the 10% significance level. 
 
5. Alternative risk- and mispricing-based explanations 
In this section, we perform a list of robustness checks to rule out alternative risk- or 
behavioral-based explanations for the investor recognition effect we document in the paper. We first 
run Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regressions to control for a set of firm characteristics, which 
have been shown to have predictive power for cross-sectional stock returns and may be correlated 
with our proxy for investor recognition. We then proceed to examine firms’ operating performances 
and returns around quarterly earnings announcements before and after the portfolio sorts, to further 
distinguish the competing hypotheses between retail investor recognition and retail investor 
sentiment. In general, we refute these alternative explanations and affirm that the shareholder base 
growth effect is consistent with Merton’s (1987) market equilibrium model with incomplete 
information. 
 
5.1. Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regressions 
22 
 
In the following tests, we run monthly cross-sectional regressions of stock returns on 
shareholder base growth and a set of control variables, as we did in Panel B of Table 6. We first 
consider Size, B/M, and MOM as controls in the base set of tests, and then the other variables. As 
with the sorting method, we perform the regressions on all firms and separately on small, medium, 
and large size-sorted groups. We find that our measure of retail investor recognition is not 
subsumed by these alternative return determinants. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
Size, Book-to-market, Momentum. In model 1, after we add Size, B/M, and MOM in the 
regressions, SBG remains a strong predictor for stock returns across all size groups in Panels A, B, 
C, and D. Note also that B/M actually loses forecasting power within large firms, and Size exhibits a 
steady decrease in significance from the small to large groups. Surprisingly, SBG possesses a 
similar explanatory power with MOM, even though the SBG variable is constructed with six to 
eighteen month lags and is only updated annually rather than monthly for MOM. 
Breadth of Institutional Ownership. Presumably, the limitation of investor cognizance can 
apply to both retail and institutional investors, though we argue that it should particularly work for 
retail investors. In model 2, we add growth in the ownership breadth of mutual funds (IBG) besides 
the base set of controls in regressions. Consistent with the fact that the return predictability of IBG 
is inconclusive in the literature (Chen et al., 2002; Lehavy and Sloan, 2008), the coefficients on IBG 
are insignificant when we have SBG in the regressions. More importantly, SBG retains its 
economical and statistical significance in predicting future stock returns across the full sample and 
size-sorted subsamples. 
Analyst Coverage. Security analysts are considered as an important channel to increase the 
firm’s information diffusion and visibility in the market (Womack, 1996; Irvine, 2003; 
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Anantharaman and Zhang, 2008). In model 3, controlling for the number of analysts following, we 
find that in all firms and size subsamples, the magnitudes and statistical significances of the 
coefficients on SBG are not materially affected as compared to the baseline results in model 1, with 
t-statistics ranging from -2.25 to -3.19 in the four panels. 
Percentage of Institutional Ownership. As previously discussed, a decrease in the retail 
shareholder base can be a mechanical consequence of an increase in institutional ownership, and 
vice versa. Gompers and Metrick (2001) show that the increased equity holdings of institutional 
investors positively predict returns and can account for the superior performance of large firms 
during the 1980s and 1990s. However, we show in model 4 that by controlling for the level of IO, 
the explanatory power of SBG remains robust in all panels. In an unreported analysis, we also find 
that the results on SBG are unchanged by controlling for the change of IO. 
Liquidity. Mounting empirical evidence suggests that a stock’s liquidity improves when the 
firm begins to have an expansion in its shareholder base (Kadlec and McConnell, 1994; Amihud et 
al., 1999; Grullon et al., 2004). We adopt stock turnover as a rough proxy for liquidity and include it 
in the regressions of model 5. The average coefficients on SBG survive the control of turnover and 
maintain a strong explanatory power for stock returns.13 
Idiosyncratic Volatility. Ang et al. (2006, 2009) find a puzzling negative relation between 
idiosyncratic volatility (IDIVOL) and future returns. In Section 3.3, we show that returns on the 
SBG-spread portfolios are presented across IDIVOL-sorted groups. In model 6, we further test the 
relation in the regressions controlling for IDIVOL. In all samples, the coefficients on SBG are 
unaffected in both magnitude and statistical significance. 
 
13 We use Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure (ILLIQ) as another proxy for liquidity, and the results on SBG still 
hold. ILLIQ is defined as the ratio of daily absolute return to (dollar) trading volume on that day, averaged over 
the past 12 months and used to predict returns in the next month. Trading volume is divided by two for Nasdaq 
stocks. 
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Trading Volume. Barber and Odean (2008) show that individual investors are attracted to 
and are net buyers of stocks experiencing high abnormal trading volumes. Gervais et al. (2001) 
show that these stocks have high returns in the following month, because increased attention raises 
demand for them over the short horizon. As indicated in Table 1, our measure of investor 
recognition is quite persistent over time. If a positive SBG in year t-1 proxies for expected higher 
investor attention in year t, manifested in the form of high trading volume, then the positive relation 
between returns and volume in the one-month window of year t can obscure the negative relation 
between returns and SBG that we document in this paper. Consistent with this conjecture, in model 
7, the addition of trading volume leads to stronger inference on SBG. For example, in Panel A, the 
coefficient on SBG increases in both absolute magnitude and statistical significance, from -0.392 (t 
= -3.05) in baseline model 1 to -0.453 (t = -3.93) in model 7. 
Profit and Accruals. Apart from trading volume, retail investors can be attracted to a stock 
because of its noteworthy operating performance, such as return on equity. However, investors tend 
to pay less attention to information in earnings that requires greater cognitive processing ability, and 
thus underreact to information contained in accruals (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). Considering the 
return explanatory power of profitability and accruals documented by Cohen et al. (2002) and Sloan 
(1996), in models 8 and 9 we show that controlling for PROFIT and ACCR does not materially alter 
the results on SBG. This corroborates our supposition that the negative relation between returns and 
SBG is derived from increased investor awareness, rather than retail investors’ inattention to 
complicated earnings disclosures. 
Capital Investment. In Merton’s (1987) model, a firm’s expansion in investor base and 
increase in capital investment tend to coincide, arising from the same driving force – a reduced cost 
of capital. The neoclassical q-theory of investment and the real options theory advanced by 
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Cochrane (1991) and Carlson et al. (2004) postulate a negative relation between real investment and 
expected returns, and they are attested by ample empirical studies from Titman et al. (2004), 
Anderson and Garcia-Feijoo (2006), and Chen, Novy-Marx and Zhang (2010). However, when we 
add CAPEX to the base set of controls in model 10, the statistical significance of SBG remains 
strong across all panels, while CAPEX is statistically insignificant in medium- and large-sized 
groups. This implies that our variable of shareholder base growth offers an alternative measure for 
the change in a firm’s cost of capital in a more timely fashion, and hence contributes to the 
determination of expected returns beyond what capital investment can imply.14 
Probability of Information-based Trading (PIN). Easley et al. (2002) show that PIN can 
positively predict future stock returns. When a firm’s ownership structure shifts from a limited 
number of blockholders to a large number of investors, a concomitant decrease in PIN is anticipated, 
because most retail investors obtain information about a stock through public channels and thus 
stand a higher chance of being uninformed traders. Using the data of PIN for stocks traded on 
MYSE/Amex, the evidence shown in model 11 refutes the competing premise. For all subsamples, 
the coefficients on SBG retain their economical and statistical significance.15 
 
5.2. Other mispricing-based tests 
Our results so far show that returns of stocks sorted on shareholder base growth cannot be 
explained by the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model, and neither can they be explained by a 
 
14 As SBG and CAPEX carry in part the same information about a firm’s cost of capital, controlling CAPEX in the 
regressions may reduce the explanatory power of SBG. This is also supported in the data. For example, in all firms, 
the coefficient on SBG drops in both absolute magnitude and statistical significance, from -0.392 (t = -3.05) in 
baseline model 1 to -0.261 (t = -2.19) in model 10. This result is also consistent with the reduced magnitudes of 
SBGt-1 spread returns after adjusting for the Chen et al. (2010) three-factor model, as discussed in footnote 11. 
15 We only include NYSE/Amex stocks in model 11. It is reasonable to argue that NASDAQ stocks may have a 
higher probability of informed trading due to NASDAQ’s less stringent listing requirements, but they cannot be 
included in the test due to the constraints on constructing the PIN measure.  
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variety of well-documented stock return determinants. However, could they be caused by some 
market inefficiencies such as behavioral biases or market mispricing? In this section, we attempt to 
refute such alternative explanations in three respects. 
[Insert Fig. 3 Here] 
First, we show that distinct from short-run attention-grabbing variables such as trading 
volume, media news and headlines, or extreme returns, shareholder base growth is quite a persistent 
measure and can reliably predict stock returns for a variety of holding periods. In Panel A of Fig. 3, 
we plot the average shareholder base growths around portfolio formation year. Specifically, at the 
end of each year, we sort stocks based on the annual SBG during the fiscal year (we denote this as 
Year -1) as in Section 3.1, and we calculate the annual median SBG every year for 10 years around 
Year -1 for each SBG-sorted portfolio. Finally, each portfolio’s SBGs in the (-5, +5) year window 
are averaged across time and plotted. We can see that stocks with positive SBG in Year -1 tend to 
experience a sustainable growth in their shareholder bases in future years, though at a more 
moderate rate.16 Similar patterns can be found among stocks with negative SBG. The stability of 
shareholder base growth over a long horizon distinguishes itself from the aforementioned attention 
variables. 
We also examine the robustness of the shareholder base growth effect for alternative 
measurement and return prediction horizons. In an unreported table, when we sort portfolios using 
the total change of shareholder base from fiscal year t-3 (t-4) to t-1 and hold the portfolios from July 
of year t to June of year t+1, the long-short portfolio (as in Section 3.2) can still generate a 
significant FF-3 spread alpha of 0.33% (0.33%) per month. Moreover, when we use portfolio sorts 
 
16 We also construct a probability transition matrix for SBG in the (-5, +5) year window. Stocks within the top 
quartile of positive SBG in portfolio formation Year -1 have on average 65% (57%) probability of maintaining a 
positive shareholder base growth 1 (2) year(s) after portfolio formation. 
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based on the annual change of shareholder base in year t-1 (as in our baseline case) to predict stock 
returns from July of year t+1 (t+2) to June of year t+2 (t+3), the long-short portfolio can produce a 
significant monthly FF-3 spread alpha of 0.30% (0.24%) in the second (third) year after portfolio 
formation. 
Second, the burgeoning literature on retail investor sentiment casts doubt on the rationality 
of retail investors’ buying activities. Different from investor recognition, a few behavioral biases 
can cause the clustering of retail investors buying a stock. For example, investors are likely to be 
subject to extrapolative errors, whereby they extrapolate past firm (accounting) performance too far 
into the future and correct their errors later (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994). Firms that are 
welcomed and bought by these overly-optimistic investors may not be able to sustain the same 
profitability in the future, as compared to the high growth they originally see. 
As a result, we examine the firm operating performance in the (-5, +5) year window around 
the portfolio formation year, as we did for the shareholder base growth. Operating margin is defined 
as operating income before depreciation divided by contemporaneous net sales. Panel B of Fig. 3 
indicates that although stocks with positive SBG have, on average, higher operating margin than 
stocks with negative SBG, each portfolio’s operating margin remains relatively stable and does not 
appear to change significantly before and after the portfolio formation year (Year -1). A rigorous 
statistical test ascertains that the differences in operating margins between Year -1 and Year +1 are 
not significant for both positive high and negative low SBG portfolios. 
Third, if investors are subject to extrapolative errors, it is possible that firms’ future earnings 
are not in line with investors’ original expectation. To test whether investors are later surprised by 
earnings news, following La Porta et al. (1997) and Cooper et al. (2008), we examine stock returns 
around quarterly earnings announcement dates (EADs) during Year +1. Specifically, we compare 
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the mean daily return for the 3 days around the EADs with that for all non-EADs in each SBG-
sorted portfolio.17 
In an unreported analysis, for stocks in the top quartile of positive SBG, the mean daily EAD 
and non-EAD returns are 0.08% and 0.07% respectively, with the difference at an insignificant t-
statistic of 0.45. The equally distributed daily returns among EADs and non-EADs during the post-
portfolio-formation year have far-reaching implications, because they confirm the conjecture that 
the low returns to high SBG stocks are based on reduced risk premium, rather than the extrapolation 
theory that investors overreact to past firm performance. 
In contrast, for stocks in the bottom quartile of negative SBG, the mean EAD and non-EAD 
returns are 0.19% and 0.08% respectively. The 11 basis point difference in daily returns is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (t = 4.27). The distinct stock outperformance during EADs 
can be interpreted as earnings announcements serving as a salient event that can raise investors’ 
short-term attention, especially for firms with very low recognition in the market. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have provided robust evidence that change in the retail shareholder base 
can negatively explain the cross-sectional difference in stock returns, lending empirical support to 
Merton’s (1987) hypothesis that limits to information diffusion play an important role in the capital 
market. The premise of Merton’s model, which specifies that the dissemination of information may 
not be perfectly efficient due to the limited processing ability of market participants, applies to 
 
17 EADs are gathered from the quarterly Compustat data. There are usually 3 to 4 EADs in Year +1, and we 
require at least three daily returns around EADs each year. 
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many situations. Our paper joins this strand of research by showing that this information 
dissemination differential is priced at the cross section of equity market. 
Moreover, as firms take their investor bases into consideration when issuing and 
repurchasing their own stocks, we argue and present empirical evidence that the investor 
recognition theory can partly explain the net equity issuance effect documented by Pontiff and 
Woodgate (2008) and McLean et al. (2009). 
Finally, although it is hard to completely rule out the possibility that our proxy reflects not 
investor recognition but some kind of behavioral biases on the part of sentiment investors, which 
operate in a way that they are partly captured by the shareholder base growth variable, our extensive 
robustness checks generally support the major hypothesis that is at the core of Merton’s (1987) 
rational equilibrium model with incomplete information. 
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Panel B: Time series of cross-sectional mean shareholder base growth 
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Fig. 1. Time series of level and change in shareholder base. These two figures plot the time series of 
summary statistics for the shareholder base and annual growth rate from 1975 to 2006, both for the whole 
sample and by sub-period listing groups. Firms are divided into groups based on their years of listing: before 
1975, 1975-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-1990, and 2000-2006, according to their time of first appearance in 
CRSP. Panel A represents the median number of shareholders and Panel B represents the mean annual log 
change in number of shareholders. 
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Panel A: Equal-weighted monthly return sorted by shareholder base growth 
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Panel B: Value-weighted monthly return sorted by shareholder base growth 
Fig. 2. Time series of average monthly returns for shareholder base growth portfolios. At the end of 
June of each year t from 1977 to 2007, stocks are sorted into quartiles based on the negative and positive 
shareholder base growth at the fiscal year-end t-1, respectively. These two figures first calculate the time 
series of average monthly returns for the long/short leg and the hedge portfolio that goes long in stocks with 
the greatest decrease in the number of shareholders and goes short in stocks with the greatest increase in the 
number of shareholders, and then the average returns across each year are depicted. All portfolios are 
annually rebalanced and cover the period from July 1977 to June 2008. The vertical axis represents the 
monthly return in percentage terms and the horizontal axis denotes the time. The upper panel is for equal-
weighted portfolios and the lower panel is for value-weighted portfolios. 
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Panel A. Annual median shareholder base growth in Year (-5,+5) 
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Panel B. Annual median operating margin in Year (-5,+5) 
Fig. 3. Shareholder base growth and accounting performance around event time. At the end of June of 
each year t from 1977 to 2007, stocks are sorted into quartiles based on the negative and positive shareholder 
base growth at the fiscal year-end t-1, respectively. The time-series means of the cross-sectional average 
shareholder base growth and operating margins are reported every year for 10 years around the portfolio 
formation year (Year -1). Operating margin is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by 
contemporaneous net sales. Panel A plots the annual median shareholder base growth for portfolios 5 years 
before and after the portfolio formation. Panel B plots the time-series average of the annual median operating 
margin around the formation time. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for shareholder base growth portfolios 
At the end of June of each year t from 1977 to 2007, stocks with negative and positive shareholder base growth are sorted into quartiles, respectively. 
Shareholder base growth (SBGt-1) is defined as the natural log of the ratio of the number of shareholders from the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1 
divided by the number of shareholders in t-2. The statistics in the first and second columns labeled N and MktSh measure the average number of firms 
and the average percentage of the total market capitalization in each group. SBGt-2 is the log change in number of shareholders from fiscal year end t-3 to 
fiscal year end t-2. SBt-2 (in thousands) denotes the number of shareholders at fiscal year end t-2. Size, in millions of dollars, is price times shares 
outstanding at the end of June of year t. B/M is the ratio of the book value of equity at the fiscal year end in t-1 over the market value of equity at the end 
of December of t-1.The rest of the table reports firm characteristics measured at the end of fiscal year t-1, except for NA. NSt-1 represents the log change 
of split-adjusted shares outstanding from t-2 to t-1. ROEt-1 is income before extraordinary items in t-1 divided by average common equity over t-2 to t-1. 
Advtt-1 is advertising expenses scaled by total sales in t-1. CAPEXt-1 denotes capital expenditures in t-1 scaled by net property, plant and equipment from 
t-2. AGE is the number of years since the stock’s first appearance in CRSP. IBGt-1 measures the change in the breadth of ownership among institutional 
investors at the fiscal year end t-1, as described in Chen, Hong and Stein (2002). IOt-1 is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutions at the fiscal 
year end t-1. NA is the number of analysts making fiscal year-t earnings forecast at the end of year t-1. IDIVOLt-1 is the annualized idiosyncratic volatility 
relative to the Fama-French (1993) model, computed from daily stock returns in each month and averaged over the fiscal year t-1. TOt-1 and VOLUMEt-1 
are monthly stock turnover and trading volume (in millions), divided by two for Nasdaq stocks and averaged over the fiscal year t-1. The numbers in 
columns SBGt-1, SBGt-2, SBt-2, NSt-1, ROEt-1, Advtt-1, CAPEXt-1, and AGE are time-series averages of yearly cross-sectional medians, while the numbers in 
columns Size, B/M, IBGt-1, IOt-1, NA, IDIVOLt-1, TOt-1, and VOLUMEt-1 are time-series averages of yearly cross-sectional means. Only firms with the 
number of shareholders greater than 100 and non-zero change in SBGt-1 are included. 
        Fundamentals   Accounting variables   Market variables 
    N MktSh SBGt-1 SBGt-2 SBt-2 Size B/M   NSt-1 ROEt-1 Advt t-1 CAPEXt-1 AGE   IBGt-1 IOt-1 NA IDIVOLt-1 TOt-1 VOLUMEt-1 
Negative 
Low 483 6.4% -0.17 -0.03 1.92 708 0.95   0.005 0.083 0.0185 0.22  8.6   0.0001 0.33 5.6 0.45 0.09 3.4 
2 487 12.1% -0.08 -0.05 2.02 1342 1.00   0.003 0.091 0.0178 0.19  12.3   0.0000 0.37 6.9 0.40 0.07 4.6 
3 491 18.3% -0.05 -0.04 2.57 2025 0.98   0.003 0.099 0.0186 0.19  14.7   0.0000 0.36 8.0 0.39 0.06 5.1 
High 488 17.9% -0.02 -0.02 2.53 1979 0.97   0.004 0.097 0.0199 0.20  12.5   0.0002 0.32 7.7 0.42 0.06 4.7 
Positive 
Low 334 13.5% 0.02 0.00 2.25 2293 0.85   0.008 0.106 0.0211 0.23  9.9   0.0004 0.34 7.9 0.43 0.08 6.1 
2 336 12.5% 0.07 0.02 1.98 2058 0.78   0.010 0.109 0.0210 0.26  8.5   0.0006 0.35 7.5 0.43 0.09 6.8 
3 335 12.1% 0.17 0.05 1.74 1973 0.69   0.018 0.113 0.0209 0.31  6.3   0.0007 0.36 7.1 0.45 0.10 6.6 
High 333 7.2% 0.54 0.05 1.11 1201 0.64   0.036 0.104 0.0212 0.41  4.4   0.0008 0.32 5.6 0.49 0.13 5.4 
Pos H-Neg L 0.71 0.07 -0.81 493 -0.31 0.031 0.020 0.0027 0.19 -4.18 0.0007 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.04 1.9 
t(Spread) (14.64) (7.38) (-11.53) (3.84) (-7.31) (7.48) (3.59) (4.36) (11.46) (-8.27) (6.56) (-1.30) (0.27) (4.35) (6.16) (3.33) 
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Table 2. Portfolios sorted by shareholder base growth 
At the end of June of each year t from 1977 to 2007, we form equal-weighted and value-weighted 
portfolios into quartiles based on the negative and positive change in number of shareholders in fiscal 
year t-1, respectively. The portfolios are held from July in year t to June in year t +1 and rebalanced 
annually. Stock returns are calculated from July 1977 to June 2008. Stocks with the greatest decrease in 
number of shareholders are in portfolio “Negative Low 1” and stocks with the greatest increase in number 
of shareholders are in portfolio “Positive High 4”. The row “Pos H - Neg L” represents the return spread 
between the “Positive High 4” and “Negative Low 1”. The row “Pos H - Neg” represents the return 
spread between portfolio “Positive High 4” and all stocks with decreases in number of shareholders. 
Monthly average raw return and Jensen’s alphas with respect to the CAPM and Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model are presented. Robust Newey-West (1997) t-statistics with 12-month lags are reported 
in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted 
   Mean 
CAPM 
Alpha 
FF3 
Alpha  Mean 
CAPM 
Alpha 
FF3 
Alpha 
Negative 
Low 1 1.54*** 0.43** 0.20** 1.32*** 0.18** 0.09 
(5.19) (2.10) (2.23) (5.38) (2.04) (1.03) 
2 1.56*** 0.50*** 0.22*** 1.18*** 0.13* 0.04 
(5.90) (2.75) (2.83) (5.40) (1.74) (0.42) 
3 1.44*** 0.43** 0.12* 1.12*** 0.14* 0.02 
(5.94) (2.45) (1.84) (5.77) (1.94) (0.26) 
High 4 1.53*** 0.50*** 0.25*** 1.08*** 0.12 0.00 
(6.09) (2.78) (3.17) (5.35) (1.07) (0.04) 
Positive 
Low 1 1.40*** 0.34* 0.08 1.08*** 0.08 0.01 
(5.18) (1.70) (0.78) (5.07) (0.71) (0.17) 
2 1.33*** 0.22 0.01 1.05*** -0.01 0.02 
(4.83) (1.12) (0.13) (4.35) (-0.13) (0.22) 
3 1.26*** 0.10 -0.06 1.07*** -0.05 0.07 
(4.23) (0.54) (-0.56) (4.04) (-0.58) (0.76) 
High 4 0.95*** -0.27 -0.33*** 0.75** -0.47*** -0.25** 
(2.78) (-1.29) (-2.65) (2.33) (-3.13) (-2.50) 
Pos H - Neg L -0.59*** -0.70*** -0.52*** -0.57*** -0.65*** -0.34*** 
(-4.61) (-5.59) (-4.65) (-3.09) (-3.39) (-2.71) 
Pos H - Neg -0.56*** -0.74*** -0.52*** -0.38** -0.59*** -0.27*** 
(-3.98) (-5.58) (-5.26) (-2.00) (-3.06) (-2.59) 
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Table 3. FF-3 alphas of portfolios sorted on shareholder base growth 
This table shows the Fama-French (1993) three-factor adjusted returns for portfolios sorted within various 
subsamples. All portfolios are rebalanced annually. In rows labeled “Subperiod”, portfolio returns are 
calculated for two periods separately: 1977-1992 and 1993-2008. In the row “NASDAQ Excluded”, we sort 
stocks based on the change in number of shareholders in t-1, using only NYSE/Amex stocks. In rows labeled 
“Size Group”, at the end of June of each year t, we assign stocks to three groups based on the 30th and 70th 
percentiles of NYSE market capitalization. Small stocks are below the 30th percentile. Medium stocks are 
between the 30th and 70th percentile, and Large stocks are above the 70th percentile. Then, within each size 
group, we sort stocks based on the change in number of shareholders. In the last two rows, alphas are 
calculated by exclusion of January returns and stocks with average prices less than $5 in June of each year t. 
Portfolio “Negative Low 1” refers to the portfolio of stocks with the greatest decrease in number of 
shareholders in t-1 and portfolio “Positive High 4” refers to the portfolio of stocks with the greatest increase 
in number of shareholders in t-1. The column “Pos H - Neg L” represents the return spread between portfolio 
“Positive High 4” and “Negative Low 1”. Panel A presents results for equal-weighted portfolios and Panel B 
for value-weighted portfolios. Robust Newey-West (1997) t-statistics for the “Pos H - Neg L” portfolios are 
reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Equal-Weighted 
Ranking on Shareholder Base Growth 
Negative Positive Pos H - 
Neg L 
t 
1(Low) 2 3 4(High) 1(Low) 2 3 4(High) (Spread) 
Subperiod 1977-1992 0.06 0.15* 0.09 0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.22** -0.41*** -0.47*** (-3.37) 
1993-2008 0.33** 0.31** 0.18* 0.41*** 0.24 0.07 0.09 -0.26 -0.59*** (-3.28) 
NASDAQ Excluded 0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.15* -0.06 -0.18** -0.45*** -0.49*** (-4.50) 
Size Group 
Small 0.25** 0.29** 0.27*** 0.38*** 0.15 0.09 -0.06 -0.25* -0.50*** (-4.13) 
Medium 0.01 0.13 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.09 -0.08 -0.33** -0.34** (-2.20) 
Large 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.26** -0.32*** (-2.64) 
January Excluded 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.07 -0.12 -0.19* -0.26*** -0.63*** -0.65*** (-5.43) 
Price>$5 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.17* -0.35*** -0.44*** (-4.16) 
Panel B: Value-Weighted 
Ranking on Shareholder Base Growth 
Negative Positive Pos H - t 
1(Low) 2 3 4(High) 1(Low) 2 3 4(High) Neg L (Spread) 
Subperiod 1977-1992 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.09 -0.03 -0.20* -0.30* (-1.73) 
1993-2008 0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.13 -0.40** -0.47** (-2.33) 
NASDAQ Excluded 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.34*** -0.36*** (-3.29) 
Size Group 
Small -0.01 0.06 0.03 0.07 -0.17 -0.21* -0.33** -0.39*** -0.38*** (-3.20) 
Medium 0.08 0.17* -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.04 -0.09 -0.33** -0.41*** (-2.78) 
Large 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.15 -0.20 (-1.57) 
January Excluded 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.40*** -0.49*** (-3.77) 
Price>$5 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.27*** -0.36*** (-3.03) 
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Table 4. Shareholder base growth portfolio interacted with firm characteristics 
This table examines the profitability of a trading strategy based on the shareholder base growth in 
subsamples of firms sorted by various firm characteristics. A dependent-sorting scheme is adopted by first 
allocating stocks into three terciles ranked on specific firm characteristics, and then within each tercile, 
we sort stocks into quartiles based on negative and positive SBG of year t-1 separately. Average monthly 
return on a hedge portfolio, which denotes the spread between the positive high SBG and negative low 
SBG stocks, is calculated in each characteristic subgroup, as is the difference of returns between the high 
and low characteristic groups. In Panel A, idiosyncratic volatility (IDIVOL) is computed from daily stock 
returns relative to the Fama-French (1993) model in the previous month. In Panel B, NA denotes the 
number of analysts making fiscal year-t earnings forecast at the end of year t-1. In Panel C, IO represents 
institutional ownership at the end of the previous quarter. Panel C and Panel D compute the return spreads 
conditional on the number of shareholders at fiscal year end t-2 (ShareBase) and the number of years 
since the stock’s first appearance in CRSP at fiscal year end t-1 (AGE). Robust Newey-West (1997) t-
statistics are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted 
Mean CAPM Alpha FF3 Alpha   Mean CAPM Alpha FF3 Alpha 
Panel A: First sorted by IDIVOL, then by SBG 
Low 
-0.23** -0.28*** -0.21**   -0.24 -0.27* -0.06 
(-2.45) (-3.06) (-2.42)   (-1.55) (-1.80) (-0.41) 
Medium 
-0.50*** -0.60*** -0.42***   -0.57*** -0.66*** -0.35* 
(-4.06) (-4.97) (-3.87)   (-2.77) (-3.18) (-1.82) 
High 
-0.65*** -0.78*** -0.60***   -1.16*** -1.27*** -1.06*** 
(-4.12) (-5.25) (-3.88)   (-3.50) (-3.79) (-3.43) 
High-Low 
-0.42*** -0.50*** -0.39**   -0.92*** -0.99*** -1.00*** 
(-2.63) (-3.25) (-2.45)   (-2.70) (-2.94) (-3.01) 
              
Panel B: First sorted by NA, then by SBG 
Small 
-0.62*** -0.72*** -0.62***   -0.97*** -1.08*** -1.02*** 
(-4.13) (-4.80) (-4.40)   (-4.10) (-4.78) (-4.03) 
Medium 
-0.41** -0.47** -0.22   -0.49* -0.58** -0.27 
(-2.31) (-2.56) (-1.39)   (-1.93) (-2.26) (-1.43) 
Large 
-0.45*** -0.55*** -0.35***   -0.39** -0.45** -0.17 
(-3.16) (-3.67) (-2.81)   (-2.15) (-2.33) (-1.20) 
Large-Small 
0.17 0.17 0.27*   0.58** 0.63** 0.85*** 
(1.07) (1.04) (1.69)   (2.01) (2.13) (2.84) 
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Equal-Weighted Value-Weighted 
Mean CAPM Alpha FF3 Alpha   Mean CAPM Alpha FF3 Alpha 
Panel C: First sorted by IO, then by SBG 
Low 
-0.98*** -1.12*** -0.95***   -1.21*** -1.44*** -1.14*** 
(-5.05) (-6.15) (-4.35)   (-3.13) (-3.67) (-3.25) 
Medium 
-0.50*** -0.67*** -0.42***   -0.39 -0.52* -0.18 
(-3.22) (-4.52) (-3.04)   (-1.47) (-1.95) (-0.72) 
High 
-0.26* -0.36*** -0.18   -0.35** -0.41** -0.27 
(-1.96) (-2.68) (-1.45)   (-2.13) (-2.39) (-1.62) 
High-Low 
0.71*** 0.76*** 0.77***   0.85** 1.03** 0.87** 
(3.25) (3.50) (3.23)   (2.21) (2.52) (2.32) 
              
Panel D: First sorted by ShareBase, then by SBG 
Low 
-0.48*** -0.62*** -0.51***   -0.82*** -1.03*** -0.74*** 
(-3.06) (-4.20) (-3.29)   (-3.19) (-4.15) (-3.19) 
Medium 
-0.44*** -0.57*** -0.40***   -0.48** -0.54** -0.32* 
(-2.96) (-4.15) (-2.90)   (-2.14) (-2.47) (-1.66) 
High 
-0.65*** -0.65*** -0.45***   -0.39** -0.42** -0.15 
(-4.85) (-4.71) (-3.38)   (-2.31) (-2.45) (-0.95) 
High-Low 
-0.16 -0.03 0.06   0.43 0.61** 0.59** 
(-0.87) (-0.17) (0.34)   (1.55) (2.33) (1.98) 
              
Panel E: First sorted by AGE, then by SBG 
Young 
-0.38** -0.53*** -0.36**   -0.54** -0.73*** -0.37* 
(-2.48) (-3.61) (-2.31)   (-2.30) (-3.19) (-1.87) 
Medium 
-0.62*** -0.69*** -0.50***   -0.52** -0.56*** -0.29 
(-4.63) (-5.38) (-3.91)   (-2.45) (-2.60) (-1.53) 
Old 
-0.21* -0.22* -0.12   -0.40** -0.34** -0.26* 
(-1.77) (-1.87) (-1.08)   (-2.54) (-2.20) (-1.71) 
Old-Young 
0.17 0.31* 0.23   0.14 0.39 0.10 
(0.92) (1.73) (1.21)   (0.49) (1.47) (0.40) 
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Table 5. Shareholder base growth on net equity issuance, SEO, repurchase, and stock M&A 
From 1976 to 2006, Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regressions are run each year with each firm’s shareholder base growth (SBGt) as the 
dependent variable. SBGt is defined as the change in the natural log of number of shareholders from the fiscal year-end t-1 to t. NSt represents the 
log change of split-adjusted shares outstanding from t-1 to t. SEO, REP, MAT and MAA are dummy variables for whether the firm experiences an 
SEO, a share repurchase, being a target or an acquirer in a stock merger and acquisition for the fiscal year t-1, t and t+1, as denoted in their 
subscripts. The time-series means of the estimated coefficients and intercept are reported and average R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Model Int NSt SEOt-1 SEOt SEOt+1 REPt-1 REPt REPt+1 MATt-1 MATt MATt+1 MAAt-1 MAAt MAAt+1 R2 
1 0.019*** 0.389*** 4.49% 
  (3.08) (7.60) 
2 0.024*** 0.090*** 0.118*** 0.029** 1.38% 
  (3.98) (2.97) (6.00) (2.27) 
3 0.036*** -0.019** -0.014** 0.020** -0.02% 
  (4.88) (-2.36) (-2.18) (2.53) 
4 0.035*** 0.064 -0.152*** -0.031* 0.43% 
  (5.17) (1.45) (-4.33) (-1.88) 
5 0.033*** 0.055 0.078** 0.049 0.07% 
  (4.83) (1.00) (2.23) (1.63) 
6 0.030*** 0.128*** -0.014** -0.149*** 0.059* 1.43% 
  (4.75) (7.19) (-2.17) (-4.22) (1.77) 
7 0.027*** 0.090*** 0.115*** 0.027** -0.016** -0.014* 0.016** 0.063 -0.151*** -0.029* 0.026 0.056 0.04 1.86% 
  (4.26) (2.92) (5.77) (2.12) (-2.05) (-1.97) (2.05) (1.44) (-4.30) (-1.74) (0.46) (1.66) (1.28) 
8 0.014** 0.375*** 0.090*** 0.056** 0.022* -0.006 -0.004 0.018** 0.046 -0.153*** -0.02 0.019 0.04 0.036 5.60% 
  (2.55) (6.32) (3.12) (2.21) (1.75) (-0.79) (-0.62) (2.30) (1.03) (-4.53) (-1.33) (0.33) (1.18) (1.12) 
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Table 6. Stock returns on shareholder base growth and net equity issuance 
In Panel A, at the end of June of each year t from 1977 to 2007, we first form equal-weighted quartile 
portfolios by sorting stocks based on NS, and calculate the monthly average raw and risk-adjusted returns 
for each quartile as well as the spread between the highest and lowest NS quartile portfolios. Next, we 
control for the SBG effect, by first sorting stocks into quartiles based on SBG, and then within each 
quartile, sorting stocks into quartiles based on NS. The four NS portfolios are then averaged over each of 
the four SBG portfolios, and equal-weighted portfolio returns are reported. The column △α denotes the 
difference of spread portfolio returns between the one-way and two-way sorts, and the column |△α|/|α| 
denotes the difference as a percentage of the spread returns on the one-way sorts. For stock returns from 
July of year t to June of t+1, SBG and NS are the log change in the number of shareholders and shares 
outstanding from fiscal year-end t-2 to t-1. 
Panel B shows monthly Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regressions of stock returns on SBG and NS for 
three different samples. Model 1 and 2 includes all firms; Model 3 excludes stocks that experience an 
SEO, a repurchase or a stock M&A during the 12 months before the monthly returns are measured; and 
Model 4 includes only stocks with zero NS. For stock returns from July of year t to June of t+1, Size is the 
logarithm of market capitalization in June of t (in millions); B/M is the natural log of ratio of book equity 
at the fiscal year-end t-1 over market equity in December of t-1. To predict returns in month j, MOM is 
the buy-and-hold return from month j-12 to j-2. The time-series means of the estimated coefficients and 
intercept are reported, and average R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. The t-statistics, shown in 
brackets, are calculated based on time-series standard errors of the monthly slopes and corrected for 
Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation with 12-month lags. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: Portfolios Sorted by NS 
1. One-way Sorts               
  1(Low) 2 3 4(High) 4 - 1       
Mean 1.65*** 1.57*** 1.50*** 0.99*** -0.66***       
  (6.74) (5.93) (5.23) (2.93) (-3.51)       
CAPM Alpha 0.65*** 0.55*** 0.37* -0.21 -0.86***       
  (3.35) (2.74) (1.92) (-1.00) (-4.95)       
FF3 Alpha 0.35*** 0.23*** 0.20** -0.32*** -0.66***       
  (3.68) (2.67) (2.21) (-2.95) (-5.03)       
                  
2. Controlling for SBG               
  1(Low) 2 3 4(High) 4 - 1    ?α |?α|/|α| 
Mean 1.61*** 1.54*** 1.45*** 1.08*** -0.54***   -0.12*** 18% 
  (6.58) (5.62) (5.14) (3.32) (-3.35)   (-3.04)   
CAPM Alpha 0.61*** 0.50** 0.32* -0.10 -0.71***   -0.15*** 17% 
  (3.16) (2.48) (1.75) (-0.48) (-4.61)   (-4.47)   
FF3 Alpha 0.31*** 0.20** 0.14* -0.22** -0.53***   -0.13*** 20% 
  (3.35) (2.30) (1.73) (-2.23) (-4.47)   (-4.51)   
 
Panel B: Fama-Macbeth Regressions 
Model Int SBG NS Size B/M MOM R2 obs 
1  1.684*** -0.392***   -0.143** 0.278*** 0.473*** 2.41% 3503 
  (3.53) (-3.05)   (-2.46) (2.69) (3.49)     
2  1.779*** -0.213* -1.865*** -0.149*** 0.250*** 0.455*** 2.56% 3503 
  (3.70) (-1.81) (-5.74) (-2.60) (2.73) (3.28)     
3  1.801*** -0.264** -1.844*** -0.155*** 0.253*** 0.438*** 2.47% 3134 
  (3.72) (-2.17) (-5.24) (-2.67) (2.77) (3.08)     
4  1.869*** -0.484*   -0.226*** 0.348*** 0.196 1.81% 428 
   (4.01) (-1.72)    (-3.36) (3.33) (1.30)      
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Table 7. Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regressions 
 
This table shows average slopes and their t-statistics from monthly cross-sectional return regressions for both the whole sample and sub-size groups. Size 
groups are defined by assigning firms into one of three groups (small, medium, and large) using the 30th and 70th percentiles of NYSE market 
capitalization breakpoints in June of year t. SBG, Size, B/M, and MOM are defined the same as in Table 6. For stock returns from July of year t to June of 
t+1, PROFIT denotes the income before extraordinary items minus dividends on preferred stock plus income statement deferred taxes, divided by book 
equity at t-1; ACCR is the change in operating working capital from t-2 to t-1 divided by book equity for t-1, where operating working capital is current 
assets minus cash and short-term investments minus current liabilities plus debt in current liabilities; CAPEX represents capital expenditures in t-1 scaled 
by net property, plant and equipment from t-2. To predict returns in month j, TO and VOLUME are the logarithm of stock turnover and trading volume 
(in millions) in month j-1, divided by two for Nasdaq stocks; IDIVOL is the annualized idiosyncratic volatility relative to the Fama-French (1993) model, 
computed from daily stock returns in month j-1 and in percentage terms. IBG is the change in the breadth of ownership among institutional investors, and 
IO is the fraction of shares outstanding held by institutions, both measured at the end of last quarter. NA is the number of analysts making fiscal year-t 
earnings forecast at the end of year t-1. PIN denotes the probability of informed trading at the end of calendar year t-1 from Easley, Hvidkjaer, and 
O’Hara (2008). All accounting variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. Only firms with the number of shareholders greater than 100 are 
included, with the monthly average number of stocks in the regression shown in the last column. The sample period is from July 1977 to June 2008 for 
all controls except IBG and IO (February 1980 to June 2008) and PIN (January 1984 to December 2002). The time-series means of the estimated 
coefficients and intercept are reported, and average R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom. The t-statistics, shown in brackets, are calculated based on 
time-series standard errors of the monthly slopes and corrected for Newey-West (1987) autocorrelation with 12-month lags. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Panel A. All Firms   
Model Int SBG Size B/M MOM IBG NA IO TO IDIVOL VOLUME PROFIT ACCR CAPEX PIN R2 obs 
1  1.684*** -0.392*** -0.143** 0.278*** 0.473*** . . . . . . . . . . 2.41% 3525 
  (3.53) (-3.05) (-2.46) (2.69) (3.49)                         
2  1.642*** -0.411*** -0.141** 0.283*** 0.467*** 11.291 . . . . . . . . . 2.53% 3525 
  (3.45) (-3.23) (-2.45) (2.81) (3.54) (1.59)                       
3  2.055*** -0.400*** -0.257*** 0.253** 0.502*** . 0.041*** . . . . . . . . 2.61% 3525 
  (3.93) (-3.16) (-3.45) (2.44) (3.77)   (4.39)                     
4  1.681*** -0.377*** -0.170*** 0.272*** 0.477*** . . 0.437** . . . . . . . 2.59% 3525 
  (3.59) (-2.96) (-3.08) (2.70) (3.52)     (2.56)                   
5  1.724*** -0.411*** -0.141** 0.273*** 0.532*** . . . -0.918 . . . . . . 3.06% 3317 
  (3.57) (-3.19) (-2.31) (2.72) (3.73)       (-1.20)                 
6  1.696*** -0.378*** -0.136*** 0.261*** 0.491*** . . . . -0.322 . . . . . 3.04% 3524 
  (4.28) (-3.13) (-2.86) (2.73) (4.06)         (-1.29)               
7  2.287*** -0.453*** -0.244** 0.309*** 0.504*** . . . . . 0.140* . . . . 3.48% 3313 
  (2.82) (-3.93) (-2.09) (3.40) (3.73)           (1.66)             
8  1.666*** -0.402*** -0.141*** 0.282*** 0.450*** . . . . . . 0.069 . . . 2.71% 3521 
  (3.85) (-3.12) (-2.95) (3.18) (3.39)             (0.39)           
9  1.713*** -0.356*** -0.144** 0.299*** 0.437*** . . . . . . . -0.459*** . . 2.39% 3134 
  (3.55) (-2.79) (-2.45) (2.94) (3.28)               (-2.91)         
10  1.829*** -0.261** -0.152*** 0.254** 0.447*** . . . . . . . . -0.300*** . 2.50% 3283 
  (3.91) (-2.19) (-2.64) (2.59) (3.35)                 (-3.68)       
11  0.108 -0.369*** 0.038 0.205** 0.776*** . . . . . . . . . 1.182* 3.06% 1630 
  (0.19) (-2.64) (0.63) (2.47) (4.17)                   (1.80)     
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Panel B. Small Size Firms   
Model Int SBG Size B/M MOM IBG NA IO TO IDIVOL VOLUME PROFIT ACCR CAPEX PIN R2 obs 
1  2.309*** -0.351** -0.335*** 0.290*** 0.428*** . . . . . . . . . . 1.79% 2277 
  (4.36) (-2.53) (-4.02) (2.61) (3.56)                         
2  2.422*** -0.370*** -0.358*** 0.283*** 0.427*** 9.484 . . . . . . . . . 1.83% 2277 
  (4.60) (-2.66) (-4.27) (2.63) (3.65) (0.42)                       
3  2.657*** -0.390*** -0.436*** 0.255** 0.463*** . 0.065*** . . . . . . . . 1.87% 2277 
  (4.54) (-2.87) (-4.5) (2.27) (3.97)   (3.03)                     
4  2.336*** -0.335** -0.393*** 0.266** 0.434*** . . 0.840*** . . . . . . . 1.88% 2277 
  (4.54) (-2.43) (-4.96) (2.49) (3.62)     (4.09)                   
5  2.344*** -0.434*** -0.337*** 0.271** 0.482*** . . . -0.153 . . . . . . 2.26% 2101 
  (4.33) (-2.95) (-3.84) (2.41) (3.73)       (-0.12)                 
6  2.350*** -0.331** -0.327*** 0.270** 0.453*** . . . . -0.364 . . . . . 2.43% 2276 
  (5.59) (-2.52) (-4.94) (2.58) (4.27)         (-1.53)               
7  2.963*** -0.480*** -0.434*** 0.322*** 0.449*** . . . . . 0.168* . . . . 2.74% 2098 
  (3.43) (-3.76) (-3.23) (3.29) (3.73)           (1.82)             
8  2.275*** -0.361*** -0.330*** 0.300*** 0.405*** . . . . . . 0.037 . . . 2.07% 2273 
  (4.85) (-2.59) (-4.81) (3.30) (3.41)             (0.21)           
9  2.328*** -0.317** -0.333*** 0.311*** 0.408*** . . . . . . . -0.446*** . . 1.83% 2096 
  (4.41) (-2.35) (-4.04) (2.80) (3.39)               (-2.62)         
10  2.431*** -0.209* -0.340*** 0.272** 0.410*** . . . . . . . . -0.266*** . 1.87% 2172 
  (4.62) (-1.68) (-4.03) (2.47) (3.46)                 (-3.58)       
11  0.847 -0.366* -0.168 0.247** 0.865*** . . . . . . . . . 1.375 2.33% 716 
  (0.96) (-1.88) (-1.19) (2.09) (4.48)                   (1.46)     
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Panel C. Medium Size Firms   
Model Int SBG Size B/M MOM IBG NA IO TO IDIVOL VOLUME PROFIT ACCR CAPEX PIN R2 obs 
1  0.64 -0.355** 0.004 0.184* 0.835*** . . . . . . . . . . 3.78% 796 
  (1.34) (-2.25) (0.06) (1.74) (3.58)                         
2  0.737 -0.356** -0.012 0.174* 0.843*** 2.389 . . . . . . . . . 4.02% 796 
  (1.51) (-2.25) (-0.21) (1.69) (3.73) (0.24)                       
3  0.974* -0.352** -0.065 0.162 0.848*** . 0.018 . . . . . . . . 4.22% 796 
  (1.79) (-2.25) (-0.8) (1.56) (3.72)   (1.52)                     
4  0.687 -0.334** -0.018 0.181* 0.832*** . . 0.230 . . . . . . . 4.37% 796 
  (1.42) (-2.13) (-0.29) (1.72) (3.56)     (1.11)                   
5  0.707 -0.278* 0.002 0.210** 0.873*** . . . -1.093 . . . . . . 4.94% 765 
  (1.39) (-1.80) (0.03) (2.09) (3.76)       (-1.22)                 
6  1.384*** -0.313** -0.054 0.11 0.825*** . . . . -1.606*** . . . . . 5.02% 796 
  (3.29) (-2.00) (-1.08) (1.20) (3.97)         (-3.85)               
7  0.623 -0.279* 0.007 0.223** 0.876*** . . . . . -0.013 . . . . 5.23% 765 
  (0.81) (-1.82) (0.07) (2.18) (3.91)           (-0.20)             
8  0.708 -0.406** -0.022 0.200* 0.814*** . . . . . . 0.805*** . . . 4.33% 795 
  (1.52) (-2.52) (-0.39) (1.92) (3.58)             (2.77)           
9  0.533 -0.297* 0.021 0.204** 0.756*** . . . . . . . -0.109 . . 3.82% 666 
  (1.05) (-1.79) (0.34) (2.08) (3.24)               (-0.65)         
10  0.675 -0.304** 0.007 0.166** 0.773*** . . . . . . . . -0.198 . 4.28% 706 
  (1.42) (-2.14) (0.12) (1.97) (3.30)                 (-1.31)       
11  -0.909 -0.352** 0.217*** 0.185** 0.735*** . . . . . . . . . 0.124 3.14% 518 
  (-1.36) (-2.09) (2.64) (2.14) (3.20)                   (0.14)     
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Panel D. Large Size Firms   
Model Int SBG Size B/M MOM IBG NA IO TO IDIVOL VOLUME PROFIT ACCR CAPEX PIN R2 obs 
1  1.009* -0.646*** -0.05 0.074 0.675** . . . . . . . . . . 6.28% 452 
  (1.76) (-3.18) (-0.85) (0.78) (2.58)                         
2  1.121** -0.654*** -0.066 0.066 0.651** 3.303 . . . . . . . . . 6.63% 452 
  (2.00) (-3.26) (-1.12) (0.71) (2.50) (0.54)                       
3  1.268** -0.626*** -0.097 0.067 0.679*** . 0.011 . . . . . . . . 6.84% 452 
  (2.17) (-3.19) (-1.34) (0.71) (2.60)   (1.55)                     
4  0.826 -0.598*** -0.054 0.082 0.705*** . . 0.346 . . . . . . . 7.11% 452 
  (1.52) (-2.90) (-0.91) (0.87) (2.70)     (1.43)                   
5  0.937* -0.687*** -0.045 0.069 0.708*** . . . 0.451 . . . . . . 8.15% 450 
  (1.69) (-3.22) (-0.78) (0.79) (2.70)       (0.41)                 
6  1.188** -0.610*** -0.064 0.04 0.730*** . . . . -0.525 . . . . . 7.93% 452 
  (1.99) (-3.13) (-1.06) (0.45) (3.05)         (-0.81)               
7  1.055 -0.669*** -0.059 0.08 0.702*** . . . . . 0.013 . . . . 7.39% 450 
  (1.44) (-3.18) (-0.64) (0.89) (2.79)           -0.22             
8  1.032* -0.644*** -0.061 0.096 0.630** . . . . . . 0.498  . . . 6.91% 452 
  (1.80) (-3.15) (-1.04) (0.98) (2.49)             (1.29)           
9  0.942 -0.677*** -0.041 0.056 0.624** . . . . . . . -0.182 . . 6.64% 371 
  (1.53) (-3.10) (-0.63) (0.61) (2.50)               (-0.82)         
10  1.029* -0.594*** -0.051 0.049 0.611** . . . . . . . . -0.048 . 7.31% 405 
  (1.71) (-2.75) (-0.82) (0.60) (2.52)                 (-0.22)       
11  0.411 -0.369* 0.026 0.01 0.612* . . . . . . . . . -0.633 5.53% 396 
  (0.48) (-1.68) (0.30) (0.10) (1.87)                   (-0.60)     
 
